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Abstract—The problem of resource allocation in multiple-
antenna wiretap channels is investigated, wherein a malicious
user tries to eavesdrop the communication between two legit-
imate users. Both multiple input single output single-antenna
eavesdropper (MISO-SE) and multiple input multiple output
multiple-antenna eavesdropper (MIMO-ME) systems are consid-
ered. Unlike most papers dealing with physical layer security,
the focus of the resource allocation process here is not to
maximize the secrecy capacity, but rather to maximize the energy
efficiency of the system. Two fractional energy-efficient metrics
are introduced, namely the ratios between the system secrecy
capacity and the consumed power, and between the system
secret-key rate and the consumed power. Both performance
metrics are measured in bit/Joule, and result in non-concave
fractional optimization problems, which are tackled by fractional
programming theory and sequential convex optimization. For
both performance metrics, the energy-efficient resource allocation
is carried out considering both perfect as well as statistical
channel state information (CSI) as to the channel from the
legitimate transmitter to the eavesdropper.
Index Terms—Energy efficiency, physical layer security, re-
source allocation, power control, fractional programming, statis-
tical CSI, MISO-SE, MIMO-ME.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently subject to attacks
from malicious users, due to their broadcast nature. Since
the seminal paper [1], physical layer security has studied
the transmission techniques to achieve unconditionally con-
fidential communication in presence of eavesdroppers [2], [3].
Unlike traditional cryptography which requires private key
generation and distribution, physical layer security exploits
the nature of the communication channel to confuse the
eavesdropper, transmitting at a lower rate than the system
secrecy capacity. However, secrecy capacity optimization is
usually not energy-efficient, because it typically requires to
transmit at the maximum feasible power. Indeed, in MISO-
SE systems with perfect CSI of the legitimate channel and
statistical CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel, [4] proves that,
under mild conditions, using full transmit power is optimal.
As for MIMO-ME systems with statistical CSI, full transmit
power is shown to be optimal in [5, Theorem 1], whereas with
perfect CSI, [6] shows that full transmit power is optimal for
degraded wiretap channels.
As a result, secrecy capacity maximization leads to large
energy consumptions, which are not desirable in present
and forthcoming communication networks. Information and
communication technologies (ICT) are responsible for about
5% of the entire world energy consumption, and this per-
centage is rapidly growing due to the exponential increase of
connected devices and infrastructure nodes. It is foreseen that
the number of connected nodes will reach 50 billion by 2020
and that the energy demand will soon become unmanageable
[7]. Moreover, the resulting greenhouse gas emissions and
electromagnetic pollution will exceed safety thresholds. For
these reasons, energy efficiency is rapidly becoming a critical
performance measure for future wireless networks, which, in
addition, also require a massive increase of secure and safe
communications.
These remarks motivate us to study the problem of resource
allocation for secure communications from an energy-efficient
perspective. Rather than the well-investigated secrecy capacity
optimization problem [8]–[13], energy-efficient performance
measures should be introduced, which are able to trade-off
between the contrasting needs to ensure a reliable and secure
communication, and to limit power consumptions. From a
physical standpoint, the energy efficiency of a communication
system is defined as the benefit-cost ratio in terms of amount
of information reliably transmitted and of consumed energy.
In systems which do not require a secret communication, this
leads to the well-established definition of the energy efficiency
as the ratio between the system capacity (or achievable rate)
over the consumed power [14]. The natural extension to the
case in which a reliable and secure communication is required,
is to consider the ratio between the secrecy capacity (or
secrecy rate) and the consumed power. This metric, which we
label secrecy energy efficiency (SEE), is measured in bit/Joule
and represents the amount of bits which can be reliably and
secretly transmitted per Joule of consumed energy.
The SEE is a natural measure to consider in scenarios where
secrecy is ensured by transmitting at a lower data-rate than
the system secrecy capacity. However, as already mentioned,
a more traditional technique to ensure secrecy is to rely on a
cryptographic key. In this case, physical layer security tools
can still prove very useful to allow secure key generation
and the concept of secret-key rate has been introduced [3],
which measures the amount of bits securely distributed over a
public channel between the legitimate users for key-generation
purposes [15]. Pioneering works on secret key agreement
using physical layer security arguments are [16]–[18], which
considered a broadcast channel with a public channel for
communications between the users, while in [19], [20] key
sharing was considered in fading channels. In systems using
a cryptographic key for secrecy, a more suitable definition of
energy efficiency appears to be the ratio between the system
secret-key rate, and the consumed power, which we label as
Secret-key energy efficiency (SKEE). As the SEE, the SKEE
is measured in bit/Joule, and it represents the number of bits
which can be securely distributed over a public channel per
Joule of consumed energy.
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2Very few previous contributions on energy efficiency in
wiretap channels have appeared, which however consider
neither the SEE nor the SKEE. We mention [21] where
the ratio between the system outage probability and the
consumed energy is optimized for a downlink orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) network, [22]
where the secrecy-energy trade-off in single-antenna, single-
carrier Gaussian wiretap channels is studied in terms of
actual communication rate and consumed energy, and [23],
which provides an information-theoretic analysis of secret
communications per transmission cost.
Motivated by this background, unlike previous contribu-
tions, in this work we study the problem of energy-efficient
resource allocation in multiple-antenna systems. Besides in-
troducing the two new energy-efficient metrics of SEE and
SKEE, we make the following contributions:
• we consider the maximization of the SEE and of the
SKEE both in MISO-SE and MIMO-ME systems, which
leads to challenging non-concave, fractional problems. As
for MISO-SE systems, we leverage generalized concavity
theory to provide transmit power and beamforming vector
optimization algorithms, which are able to globally maxi-
mize the considered energy-efficient metrics, with limited
complexity. As for the MIMO-ME case, the optimization
problems are tackled by fractional programming theory as
far as SKEE maximization is concerned and by combin-
ing fractional programming theory with the framework of
sequential convex optimization, for SEE maximization.
The proposed approach globally maximizes the SKEE,
and is guaranteed to converge to a point fulfilling the
Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of the
SEE maximization problem;
• we develop the described resource allocation methods
considering both the scenarios in which the legitimate
transmitter has perfect CSI of all propagation channels,
and that in which the legitimate transmitter only knows
the statistics of the channel to the eavesdropper;
• the proposed energy-efficient algorithms can be readily
specialized to the case in which the secrecy rate or the
secret-key rate are to be optimized. In the general MIMO-
ME scenario, secrecy rate optimization is still an open
problem, and numerical results suggest that our approach
outperforms competing alternatives and achieves near-
optimal performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model and formulates the considered
optimization problems. Sections III and IV contain the main
contributions of the paper, providing the energy-efficient re-
source allocation algorithms for the MISO-SE and MIMO-
ME scenarios, respectively, with both perfect and statistical
CSI. Section V illustrates numerical results to assess the
performance of the proposed resource allocation methods. Fi-
nally, Section VI contains concluding remarks. Important basic
results on generalized concavity and fractional programming
is provided in Appendix A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The considered system model is depicted in Fig. 1. A
legitimate transmitter (Alice) is equipped with NA antennas
and wants to have a secure communication with its intended
receiver (Bob), equipped with NB antennas, in presence of
an eavesdropper (Eve), equipped with NE antennas. Denote
by H and G the NB × NA and NE × NA matrix channels
between Alice and Bob, and Alice and Eve, respectively, and
by Q the transmit covariance matrix at Alice, subject to the
power constraint tr(Q) ≤ Pmax, with Pmax the maximum
feasible transmit powers1. Then, the total power consumed in
the system is given by the sum of the transmit power µtr(Q),
with µ = 1/η and η the transmit amplifier efficiency, and the
hardware power Pc required to operate the legitimate system.
As mentioned in the introduction, two energy-efficient per-
formance metrics will be considered.
• The SEE, defined as the ratio between the secrecy rate
and the consumed power, namely
SEE =
log

∣∣∣INB +HQHH ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE +GQGH ∣∣∣

µtr(Q) + Pc
, (1)
which represents the amount of bits that can be reliably
and secretly transmitted without being eavesdropped by
Eve.
• The SKEE, defined as the ratio between the secret-key
rate and the consumed power, namely
SKEE =
log

∣∣∣INA +Q(HHH +GHG)∣∣∣
log
∣∣∣INA +QGHG∣∣∣

µtr(Q) + Pc
, (2)
which represents the amount of cryptographic-key bits
per Joule of consumed energy, on which the legitimate
users can secretly agree. For the derivation of the secret-
key rate at the numerator of (2) we refer to [24, Lemma
2].
Assuming Alice has perfect CSI of both channels H and G,
(1) and (2) can be directly used for resource allocation pur-
poses. However, in some practical instances of communication
systems, it is more realistic to assume that Alice does not
perfectly known the channel to the eavesdropper, but only its
statistics2. In this case, the ergodic counterparts of (1) and (2)
1In some scenarios it might be useful to set a positive minimum transmit
power Pmin, for quality-of-service reasons. The results to be presented can
be straightforwardly extended to such a scenario.
2In any case we assume that Bob has perfect CSI ofH , and Eve has perfect
CSI of H and G.
3should be considered for resource allocation purposes, namely
SEEerg =
EG
log

∣∣∣INB +HQHH ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE +GQGH ∣∣∣

µtr(Q) + Pc
(3)
SKEEerg =
EG
log

∣∣∣INA +Q(HHH +GHG)∣∣∣∣∣∣INA +QGHG∣∣∣

µtr(Q) + Pc
.
(4)
The problem to be tackled in the rest of this work is
the maximization of both SEE and EEkey , with respect to
the choice of the legitimate user’s covariance matrix Q,
considering both the perfect and statistical CSI cases. In the
next two sections, the problem will be first analyzed for the
special case in which Bob and Eve are equipped with a single
antenna, and then in the more challenging scenario in which
multiple antennas are equipped at all nodes. In the former
case, we will show that the problem can be reformulated as a
fractional problem whose objective has a concave numerator
and an affine denominator. The theory of generalized con-
cavity, which is briefly reviewed in Appendix A, ensures that
such an objective is a pseudo-concave (PC) function, for which
first-order optimality conditions are necessary and sufficient.
Instead, the latter scenario is more challenging and results in
vector-valued or matrix-valued fractional problems, which are
tackled leveraging fractional programming theory. The tools
and results of fractional programming theory to be used in the
sequel are also reviewed in Appendix A.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR SEE MAXIMIZATION
When NB = NE = 1, let us denote by w and p the
legitimate user’s unit-norm beamforming vector and transmit
power, respectively, subject to the constraint p ≤ Pmax. Then,
the expressions of (1) and (2) simplify to
SEE =
log
(
1 + pwHhhHw
1 + pwHggHw
)
µp+ Pc
, (5)
and
SKEE =
log
(
1 + pwH(hhH + ggH)w
1 + pwHggHw
)
µp+ Pc
, (6)
respectively. The maximization of (5) and (6) are dealt with
in Sections III-A and III-B, respectively, for the perfect CSI
case, while the case of statistical CSI is addressed in Sections
III-C and III-D.
A. SEE maximization with perfect CSI
If Alice has perfect knowledge of the channel g, the SEE
maximization problem can be formulated as the optimization
program
max
p,w
SEE (7a)
s.t. p ∈ [0, Pmax] (7b)
‖w‖ = 1 . (7c)
To begin with, we see that the beamforming vector w affects
only the numerator of (7a) and therefore should be chosen as
the unit-norm vector that maximizes the secrecy rate. It is
known that the solution to this problem is the dominant, unit-
norm, generalized eigenvector of the matrix pencil (INA +
phhH , INA + pgg
H). Plugging the optimal w into (7), we
obtain the power control problem
max
p,w
log (λgen(p))
µp+ Pc
(8a)
s.t. p ∈ [0, Pmax] , (8b)
wherein λgen(p) denotes the maximum generalized eigenvalue
of (INA + phh
H , INA + pgg
H). The dependence of λgen
on p is rather involved, but it can be expressed in closed-form,
leveraging the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let x and y be two arbitrary N -dimensional
vectors. The matrix xxH − yyH has at most two non-zero
eigenvalues (λ1, λ2) which are expressed as in (9) on top of
next page.
This result is stated without a proof in [8]. A proof can be
given as follows.
Proof: The matrix xxH − yyH has at most rank 2 and
therefore has at most two non-zero eigenvalues, λ1 and λ2.
Then we have,
λ1 + λ2 = tr(xx
H − yyH) = ‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2 ,
(1 + λ1)(1 + λ2) =
∣∣IN + xxH − yyH ∣∣ .
(10)
Elaborating on the second equation in (10), we obtain∣∣IN + xxH − yyH ∣∣
=
∣∣IN + xxH ∣∣ ∣∣IN − (IN + xxH)−1yyH ∣∣
= (1 + ‖x‖2)
(
1− yH
(
IN − xx
H
1 + ‖x‖2
)
y
)
= 1 + ‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2 − ‖x‖2‖y‖2 + |yHx|2 .
(11)
Then, solving for λ1 in (10) we obtain
λ21 − (‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2)λ1 + |yHx|2 − ‖x‖2‖y‖2 = 0 ,
λ2 = ‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2 − λ1 .
(12)
Solving (12) yields (9).
This result can be applied to our scenario as follows.
Observe that the maximum generalized eigenvalue of (INA +
phhH , INA + pgg
H) is equal to the maximum eigenvalue
of the matrix Z shown in (13) at the top of next page,
wherein we have used the matrix inversion lemma and we have
denoted by UΛ1/2UH the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD)
of
(
INA − p gg
H
1+p‖g‖2
)1/2
. In particular, U = [u1, . . . ,uNA ]
is such that u1 = g/‖g‖, while the other NA−1 columns are
an orthonormal basis of the orthogonal complement of u1.
4λ1 =
1
2
(
‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2 +
√
(‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2)2 − 4(|yHx|2 − ‖x‖2‖y‖2)
)
λ2 =
1
2
(
‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2 −
√
(‖x‖2 − ‖y‖2)2 − 4(|yHx|2 − ‖x‖2‖y‖2)
) (9)
Z =
(
INA + pgg
H
)−1/2 (
INA + phh
H
) (
INA + pgg
H
)−1/2
=
(
INA + pgg
H
)−1
+ p
(
INA + pgg
H
)−1/2
hhH
(
INA + pgg
H
)−1/2
= INA − p
ggH
1 + p‖g‖2 + p
(
INA − p
ggH
1 + p‖g‖2
)1/2
hhH
(
INA − p
ggH
1 + p‖g‖2
)1/2
= INA − p
ggH
1 + p‖g‖2 + pUΛ
1/2UHhhHUΛ1/2UH
(13)
Q = pUΛ1/2UHhhHUΛ1/2UH − p gg
H
1 + p‖g‖2 =(√
p
1 + p‖g‖2 (u
H
1 h)u1 +
√
p
NA∑
i=2
(uHi h)ui
)(√
p
1 + p‖g‖2 (u
H
1 h)u1 +
√
p
NA∑
i=2
(uHi h)ui
)H
− p gg
H
1 + p‖g‖2
(14)
Instead, Λ1/2 = diag
(
1√
1+p‖g‖2 , 1, . . . , 1
)
. Accordingly,
the maximum eigenvalue of (13) is given by 1 + λQ(p), with
λQ(p) being the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix Q in (14),
which can be computed as a function of p leveraging Lemma
1, with
‖x‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥
√
p
1 + p‖g‖2 (u
H
1 h)u1 +
√
p
NA∑
i=2
(uHi h)ui
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
p|gHh|2
‖g‖2(1 + p‖g‖2) + p
NA∑
i=2
|uHi h|2 ,
‖y‖2 =
∥∥∥∥√ p1 + p‖g‖2 g
∥∥∥∥2 = p‖g‖21 + p‖g‖2 ,
|yHx|2 = p
1 + p‖g‖2×
×
∣∣∣∣∣∣gH
√ p(uH1 h)
1 + p‖g‖2u1 + p
NA∑
i=2
(uHi h)ui
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
p2
(1 + p‖g‖2)2 |g
Hh|2 .
(15)
Elaborating, we obtain
λQ(p) =
1
2
[
αf(p) + ωp+
√
(αf(p) + ωp)2 + 4gωpf(p)
]
,
(16)
with ω =
∑NA
i=2 |uHi h|2, g = ‖g‖2, c = |gHh|2, α = (c/g −
g), and f(p) =
p
1 + pg
. At this point we are ready to show
the following result.
Proposition 1. The objective (8a) is a strictly PC function of
p and the solution of Problem (8) is
p∗ = min(Pmax, p¯) , (17)
with p¯ the unique stationary point of (8a).
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. SKEE maximization with perfect CSI
When the secrecy key-rate is considered, the objective to
maximize is (6). In this case, let us first observe that the secret-
key rate can be expressed as
Rs,key = log
(
1 +
pwHhhHw
1 + pwHggHw
)
. (18)
Then, the optimal beamforming vector w is once again de-
termined as the solution of a generalized eigenvector prob-
lem. Specifically, the optimal w is the dominant generalized
eigenvector of the matrix pencil (phhH , INA + pgg
H), or
equivalently, the dominant eigenvector of the rank-one matrix
p(INA+pgg
H)−1/2hhH(INA+pgg
H)−1/2. The correspond-
ing maximum eigenvalue can be seen to be
λQ(p) = ph
H(INA + pgg
H)−1h
= phH
[
INA −
pggH
1 + p‖g‖2
]
h = p‖h‖2 − p
2|hHg|2
1 + p‖g‖2 ,
(19)
and (6) becomes
SKEE =
log(1 + λQ(p))
µp+ Pc
. (20)
By computing the second derivative of λQ(p), it is immedi-
ately seen that λQ(p) is a strictly concave function of p. Then,
5(20) is a strictly PC function whose maximizer subject to a
maximum power constraint is
p∗ = min(Pmax, p¯) , (21)
with p¯ the unique stationary point of (20).
C. SEE maximization with statistical CSI
Assume now that Alice does not know the actual channel
realization of the channel to the eavesdropper g, but only
its statistics. In particular, we model g as a complex cir-
cular Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and identity
covariance matrix. Then, the resource allocation problem is
formulated as the optimization program,
max
w,p
Eg
[
log
(
1 + pwHhhHw
1 + pwHggHw
)]
µp+ Pc
(22a)
s.t. p ∈ [0, Pmax] (22b)
‖w‖ = 1 . (22c)
To begin with, we rewrite the numerator of (22a) as
log
(
1 + pwHhhHw
)
−Eg
[
log
(
1 + pwHggHw
)]
, (23)
from which we can observe that the optimal beamforming
policy is to set w = h/‖h‖, because the isotropic distribution
of the channel vector g makes the direction w irrelevant for
the second term in (23). As a result, Problem (22) becomes
max
p
Eg
[
log
(
1 + p‖h‖2
1 + p|hHg|2/‖h‖2
)]
µp+ Pc
(24a)
s.t. p ∈ [0;Pmax] . (24b)
The statistical average in (24a) can be computed in closed
form following [12], and (24a) can be expressed as
log(1 + p‖h‖2)− E1
(
1
p
)
e1/p
µp+ Pc
, (25)
with E1 being the exponential integral function, as defined in
[25]. It follows that the secrecy capacity is non-negative only
for
‖h‖2 ≥ 1
p
[
exp
(
e1/pE1(1/p)
)
− 1
]
. (26)
Using [25, 5.1.20], the right-hand side (RHS) of (26) can be
bounded as
√
1 + 2p− 1
p
≤ 1
p
[
exp
(
e1/pE1(1/p)
)
− 1
]
≤ 1 , (27)
which shows that a necessary condition for (25) to be non-
negative is ‖h‖2 ≥
√
1+2p−1
p , whereas (25) is guaranteed to
be positive provided ‖h‖2 ≥ 1.
Next, we turn our attention to solving Problem (24). We
start by providing the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Define the function z(p) = 1 + 1/p − (1/p2 +
2/p)e1/pE1(1/p). For all p > 0, it holds 0 ≤ z(p) ≤ 1.
Proof: We start by showing that z(p) ≥ 0. Using [25,
5.1.14] and [25, 5.1.19], we have
E1(1/p) = p(e
−1/p − E2(1/p)) , (28)
e1/pE1(1/p) = p(1− e1/pE2(1/p)) ≤ p
2 + p
1 + 2p
. (29)
Then, it holds
z(p) ≥ 1 + 1/p− (1/p2 + 2/p)p
2 + p
1 + 2p
= 0 . (30)
Finally, using again [25, 5.1.19] we obtain
1− z(p) = −1/p+ (1/p2 + 2/p)e1/pE1(1/p)
≥ −1/p+ (1/p2 + 2/p) p
1 + p
=
1
1 + p
≥ 0 . (31)
Let us now define the function
y(p) =
z(p) +
√
z(p)
p(1− z(p)) , (32)
which is well-defined and non-negative because of Lemma 2.
The behavior of (32) is illustrated in Fig. 2, from which we
see that it is a decreasing function for positive p and that it
tends to a finite value for p → 0. Bearing this in mind, the
next result provides a condition such that (25) is strictly PC.
Proposition 2. For any given interval [Pmin, Pmax], with 0 <
Pmin < Pmax, the function in (25) is a strictly PC function
for all p ∈ [Pmin, Pmax], if
‖h‖2 > y(Pmin) . (33)
In this case, the maximizer of (25) in the interval [Pmin, Pmax]
is given by
p∗ = max(Pmin,min(Pmax, p¯)) , (34)
with p¯ the unique stationary point of (25).
Proof: We recall the following formula from [25, p. 230]
dexE1(x)
dx
= exE1(x)− 1
x
. (35)
Exploiting (35), we can compute the second derivative of the
numerator of (25) as
z(p)
p2
− ‖h‖
4
(1 + p‖h‖2)2 . (36)
Elaborating, we obtain that (36) is negative if
(1− z(p))p2‖h‖4 − 2‖h‖2pz(p)− z(p) > 0 . (37)
Solving with respect to ‖h‖2, we obtain the condition ‖h‖2 >
y(p). Then, recalling that y(p) is decreasing for positive p, we
have that (25) is strictly concave for all p ∈ [Pmin, Pmax],
provided (33) holds. Finally, (24a) is the ratio between a
strictly concave and an affine function, and is therefore strictly
PC, thus admitting a unique stationary point which coincides
with its global maximizer.
As a final remark, we observe how Fig. 2 shows that y(p)
can take larger values than 1 for small values of p. This
means that, even if ‖h‖2 ≥ 1 was sufficient to ensure the
non-negativity of (24a), it is not sufficient to guarantee that
(24a) is also PC.
6D. SKEE maximization with statistical CSI
In this scenario, the problem to solve is stated as
max
w,p
Eg
log
1 + pwH
(
hhH + ggH
)
w
1 + pwHggHw

µp+ Pc
(38a)
s.t. p ∈ [0, Pmax] (38b)
‖w‖ = 1 . (38c)
The optimal beamforming vector is once again w = h/‖h‖,
which results in the power control problem
max
p
Eg
[
log
(
1 +
p‖h‖2
1 + p|hHg|2/‖h‖2
)]
µp+ Pc
(39a)
s.t. p ∈ [0, Pmax] . (39b)
The function inside the expectation in (39a) can be checked to
be strictly concave for any channel realization g. Therefore,
the numerator of (39a) is strictly concave as it is the expecta-
tion of strictly concave functions, which ultimately implies that
(39a) is a strictly PC function. Thus, the solution to Problem
(39) is expressed as
p∗ = min(Pmax, p¯) , (40)
with p¯ the unique stationary point of (39a).
IV. SEE MAXIMIZATION IN MIMO-ME SYSTEMS
In this section we turn our attention to the general case
in which an arbitrary number of antennas is deployed at all
nodes. The structure of this section is similar to that for the
MISO-SE case. In Sections IV-A and IV-B, perfect CSI is
assumed, and the maximization of (1) and (2) is carried out,
while Sections IV-C and IV-D deal with the corresponding
maximizations with statistical CSI. In order to tackle the
resulting optimization problems, we will extensively employ
tools from fractional programming, which are introduced in
Appendix A.
A. SEE maximization with perfect CSI
In this scenario, the resource optimization problem to solve
is formulated as
max
Q0
log
∣∣∣INB +HQHH ∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣INE +GQGH ∣∣∣
µtr(Q) + Pc
(41a)
s.t. tr(Q) ∈ [0, Pmax] (41b)
The challenge in solving (41) is that the numerator of (41a)
is not concave in general, being the difference of concave
functions. In this case, as argued in Appendix A, directly using
fractional programming tools would result in an exponential
complexity. For this reason, in the following we will trade-off
complexity with optimality, developing two low-complexity
algorithms, which also enjoy pleasant optimality claims.
The first algorithm will integrate fractional programming
with the sequential convex optimization framework [26]–[30],
and will be guaranteed to converge to a Q∗ fulfilling the KKT
optimality conditions of (41) by solving a sequence of frac-
tional maximization problems with polynomial complexity.
The second algorithm, which will be referred to as eigen-
mode selection in the following, has an even lower computa-
tional complexity, requiring the solution of only one fractional
problem with polynomial complexity. However, the resulting
Q∗ will enjoy a weaker optimality claim, being guaranteed to
fulfill only a necessary condition such that the KKT conditions
of (41) are satisfied.
1) Sequential convex optimization: The idea of sequential
convex programming is to tackle a difficult maximization prob-
lem P with objective f , by solving a sequence of approximate
problems {P`}` with objectives {f`}`, such that the following
three properties are fulfilled, for all `:
(P1) f`(x) ≤ f(x), for all x;
(P2) f`(x(`−1)) = f(x), with x(`−1) the maximizer of f`−1;
(P3) ∇f`(x(`−1)) = ∇f(x)
Now, consider the sequences {x(`)}` of the solutions of the
`-th Problem P` of the sequence, and {f(x`)}` formed by the
values of the objective of the original Problem P , evaluated
at x`. If Properties (P1), (P2), and (P3) are fulfilled, both se-
quences {x(`)}` and {f(x`)}` converge. Moreover, {f(x`)}`
is monotonically increasing, while {x(`)}` converges to a
point fulfilling the KKT optimality conditions of the original
Problem P [26].
Therefore, we can determine a matrix Q which fulfills the
KKT equations of (41), provided we can find suitable lower-
bounds of (41a) which also fulfill Properties (P2) and (P3).
Moreover, the lower-bounds should be easier to maximize than
(41a). To this end, we proceed as follows. Exploiting the fact
that the numerator of (41a) is the difference of two concave
functions, for any given Q0 we can obtain a lower-bound of
(41) by replacing the second summand in the numerator with
its first-order Taylor expansion3. Then, for any Q0  0 we
have
SEE ≥ S˜EE
=
log
∣∣∣INB +HQHH ∣∣∣− (g0 + 2<{tr(MH0 (Q−Q0))})
µtr(Q) + Pc
(42)
with g0 = log
∣∣∣INE +GQ0GH ∣∣∣, M0 =
GH
(
INE +GQ0G
H
)−1
G and where we have exploited
the fact that the conjugate gradient of log
∣∣∣INE +GQGH ∣∣∣
is the Hermitian matrix GH
(
INE +GQ0G
H
)−1
G
[31]. Clearly, SEE(Q0) = S˜EE(Q0) and ∇SEE(Q0) =
∇S˜EE(Q0), for any Q0  0, so that all three Properties (P1),
(P2), and (P3) are fulfilled. Thus, in the sequential convex
optimization framework, the `-th problem P` of the sequence
3We recall that given a real-valued function g of complex, matrix argument
Q, the first-order Taylor expansion around a point Q0 is written as [31], [32]
g(Q) = g(Q0) + 2<
{
tr
(
(∇Q∗g)H
∣∣∣
Q=Q0
(Q−Q0)
)}
.
7takes the form
(P`) : max
Q0
S˜EE (43a)
s.t. tr(Q) ∈ [0, Pmax] . (43b)
The objective (43a) has a concave numerator and an affine
denominator and so it can be globally optimized by fractional
programming with polynomial complexity. Then, sequential
convex optimization and fractional programming can be inte-
grated to determine a KKT point of (41). The overall algorithm
is illustrated in Algorithm 1, and works by updating in each
iteration the point Q0 around which the Taylor expansion is
computed, and then solving (P`) using fractional program-
ming. We remark that in principle any fractional programming
method can be used to globally solve (P`) with polynomial
complexity. In Algorithm 1, and also in the rest of this paper,
without loss of generality, we resort to Dinkelbach’s algorithm,
which is the most commonly used fractional programming al-
gorithm. More details on Dinkelbach’s algorithm are reported
in Appendix A.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for SEE maximization in MIMO-ME
systems with perfect CSI.
` = 0;  > 0; Select a feasible Q(`)0 ;
while
∣∣∣SEE(Q(`)0 )− SEE(Q(`−1)0 )∣∣∣ >  do
Compute M0 and g0;
Solve Problem (43) by Dinkelbach’s algorithm and set
Q as the solution.
Q
(`)
0 = Q;
` = `+ 1;
end while
Following a similar reasoning as in [26], we can prove the
following result.
Proposition 3. After each iteration of Algorithm 1, the value
of the true SEE is not decreased. Moreover, Algorithm 1
is guaranteed to converge to a Q∗ which fulfills the KKT
optimality conditions of Problem (41).
Remark 1. We observe that Algorithm 1 can be readily
specialized to perform secrecy rate maximization, by simply
setting µ = 0 and Pc = 1. In this case Problem (43) becomes
a non-fractional, concave, problem, which can be solved by
standard methods, and a similar result as Proposition 3 holds.
2) Eigenmode selection: This approach is inspired to a
result first presented in [6]. There, the problem of secrecy
capacity maximization in MIMO-ME systems is studied and
a transmission scheme is proposed such that the resulting Q
fulfills a necessary condition for the KKT conditions of the
secrecy capacity maximization problem to hold [6, Theorem
1]. In the following we will extend this result to the problem
of SEE maximization. The first step is represented by the
following result, which extends [6, Theorem 1] to the case
of SEE.
Proposition 4. Define the EVD of Q as UQΛQUHQ , and
let u+,Q be an eigenvector of Q corresponding to a positive
eigenvalue. Then, in order to fulfill the KKT conditions of (41)
u+,Q must satisfy
uH+,Q(H
HH −GHG)u+,Q > 0 . (44)
Proof: See Appendix C.
The next step is to observe that a way to obtain a covariance
matrix Q that fulfills (44) is to solve the following optimiza-
tion problem.
max
Q0
log |INB +H+Q| − log |INE +G+Q|
µtr(Q) + Pc
, (45a)
s.t. tr(Q) ≤ Pmax , (45b)
with H+ and G+ the projection of HHH and GHG onto
the positive eigenspace of HHH − GHG, i.e. H+ =
P+H
HHP+ and G+ = P+GHGP+, with P+ =
U+U
H
+ , and U+ the semi-unitary matrix whose columns are
the eigenvectors of HHH −GHG corresponding to positive
eigenvalues. To see why this is true, we can observe that (45a)
can be equivalently rewritten as
log
∣∣∣INB +HHHP+QP+∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣INE +GHGP+QP+∣∣∣
µtr(Q) + Pc
,
(46)
from which it follows that the solution of (45a) must have
positive eigenvectors spanning the space spanned by P+.
Indeed, if the optimal Q∗+ had some eigenvectors outside the
space spanned by P+, then Q∗+ 6= P+Q∗+P+. However,
plugging Q∗+ or P+Q
∗
+P+ in the numerator of (46) yields
the same value, whereas tr(Q∗+) > tr(P+Q
∗
+P+). Therefore
Q∗+ would yield a larger denominator, and thus a smaller
objective, thus contradicting the assumption that Q∗+ is the
global optimum. So, the positive eigenvectors of Q∗+ belong
to the space spanned by P+, which coincides with the space
spanned by U+. Therefore, the positive eigenvectors of Q∗+
fulfill (44).
Focusing now on the transformed Problem (45), we observe
that the transformed channels H+ and G+ enjoy by construc-
tion the property that H+  G+. Under this condition, the
numerator of (45a) is known to be a concave function [6],
and therefore (45a) can be globally maximized by means of
fractional programming tools, such as Dinkelbach’s algorithm.
The solution Q∗+ will satisfy (44), which is a necessary condi-
tion to fulfill the KKT conditions of the original problem (41).
This shows the trade-off between the eigen-mode selection and
Algorithm 1. The first method is computationally simpler, but,
unlike Algorithm 1, can not ensure to obtain a KKT point of
(41).
Remark 2. From the discussion above, it follows that if
the original channels H and G are such that HHH 
GGH , then the eigenmode selection scheme achieves the
global optimum of the SEE. In this scenario, Algorithm 1
is also guaranteed to achieve global optimality, because if
HHH  GGH , then Problem (7) has a concave numerator,
and hence a PC objective, thus implying that KKT conditions
are necessary and sufficient optimality conditions.
8B. SKEE maximization with perfect CSI
In this case, we have to consider the following optimization
problem
max
Q0
log
∣∣∣INA +Q(HHH +GHG)∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣INA +QGHG∣∣∣
µtr(Q) + Pc
(47a)
s.t. tr(Q) ∈ [0, Pmax] . (47b)
Since it holds that HHH + GGH  GGH we have that,
as observed in Section IV-A, the numerator of (47a) is a
concave function of Q. This in turn guarantees that (47a) is
a PC of Q, given that the denominator is clearly affine in Q.
Thus, Problem (47) can be globally solved with polynomial
complexity by means of fractional programming tools, such
as Dinkelbach’s algorithm.
C. SEE maximization with statistical CSI
In this case, the resource allocation problem is formulated
as
max
Q0
log
∣∣∣INB +HQHH ∣∣∣− EG [log ∣∣∣INE +GQGH ∣∣∣]
µtr(Q) + Pc
,
(48a)
s.t. tr(Q) ∈ [0, Pmax] , (48b)
with G a random matrix with independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), Gaussian, zero-mean entries, with unit-
variance.
Due to its isotropic distribution, multiplying G, by left or
right, by a unitary matrix does not change its distribution. As a
consequence, we have that the eigenvectors of Q do not affect
the second summand at the numerator of (48a). Moreover, they
do not affect the denominator, too. Then, the eigenvectors of
Q are to be chosen so as to maximize the first summand at
the numerator, which means that Q should diagonalize the
legitimate channel. Upon doing this, (48) becomes
max
{qi≥0}i
∑NA
i=1 log (1 + qihi)− E
[
log
∣∣∣INE +∑NAi=1 qigigHi ∣∣∣]
µ
∑NA
i=1 qi + Pc
(49a)
s.t
NA∑
i=1
qi ≤ Pmax (49b)
qi ≥ 0 ,∀ , i = 1, . . . , NA , (49c)
wherein, for all i = 1, . . . , NA, qi is the i-th eigenvalue of Q,
hi is the i-th largest eigenvalue of HHH , and the statistical
expectation is with respect to gi, for all i = 1, . . . , NE , with
gi the i-th column of G. Problem (49) is still difficult to
solve because, as in the perfect CSI case, the numerator of the
objective is in general not concave. However, we can apply
a similar approach as in the perfect CSI scenario, merging
fractional programming with sequential convex optimization to
determine a KKT point of (49). Again, we will accomplish this
by computing the first-order Taylor expansion of the second
summand at the numerator of (49a). To this end, let us define
g(q) = E{gi}i
[
log
∣∣∣∣∣INE +
NA∑
i=1
qigig
H
i
∣∣∣∣∣
]
, (50)
and, for all i = 1, . . . , NA, Zi =
∑
j 6=i qjgjg
H
j + INE . Next,
the partial derivative of g with respect to the generic qk can
be computed exploiting the following formula [33],
d log |A+ xB|
dx
= tr
(
(A+ xB)−1B
)
. (51)
Then, we have
∂g
∂qk
= E{gi}i
[
gHk (Zk + qkgkg
H
k )
−1gk
]
= E{gi}i
[
gHk
(
Z−1k −
qkZ
−1
k gkg
H
k Z
−1
k
1 + qkgHk Z
−1
k gk
)
gk
]
=
1
qk
(
1− Eck
[
1
1 + qkck
])
,
(52)
wherein ck = gHk Z
−1
k gk. Then, for any feasible q0 =
{q0,i}NAi=1, the approximate problem to be considered in each
iteration of the sequential convex optimization algorithm is
expressed as
max
{qi≥0}i
NA∑
i=1
log (1 + qihi)− g(q0)−
NA∑
i=1
(qi − q0,i) ∂g
∂qi
∣∣∣q=q0
µ
NA∑
i=1
qi + Pc
(53a)
s.t.
NA∑
i=1
qi ≤ Pmax (53b)
qi ≥ 0 ,∀ i = 1, . . . , NA . (53c)
The numerator and denominator of (53a) are respectively
concave and affine in q and therefore (53) can be solved
by fractional programming with polynomial complexity. The
complete resource allocation algorithm can be formulated as
in the following Algorithm 2, which enjoys similar properties
as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for SEE maximization in MIMO-ME
systems with statistical CSI.
` = 0;  > 0; Select a feasible q(`)0 ;
while
∣∣∣SEE(q(`)0 )− SEE(q(`−1)0 )∣∣∣ >  do
Compute ∂g∂qi
∣∣∣q=q0 , for all i = 1, . . . , NA, as in (52);
Solve (53) by Dinkelbach’s algorithm, and set q as the
solution;
q
(`)
0 = q;
` = `+ 1;
end while
9D. SKEE maximization with statistical CSI
In this scenario, the resource allocation problem to address
is formulated as
max
Q0
EG
log

∣∣∣INA + (HHH +GHG)Q∣∣∣∣∣∣INA +GHGQ∣∣∣

µtr(Q) + Pc
,
(54a)
s.t. tr(Q) ∈ [0, Pmax] . (54b)
Recalling the discussion in Section IV-B, we observe that
the argument of the statistical average in (54a) is a concave
function for any realization of the channel matrix G, since we
always have HHH + GHG  GHG. This in turn implies
that the numerator of (54a) is a concave function, because of
the linearity of the expectation operator. Thus, (54) is a PC
maximization problem which can be globally and efficiently
maximized by directly applying fractional programming tools.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We focus first on the MISO-SE scenario. Figs. 3 and 4 re-
spectively illustrate the instantaneous SEE (5) and secrecy rate
versus Pmax, achieved by the following resource allocation
schemes:
• SEE maximization with perfect CSI, as described in
Section III-A;
• SEE maximization with statistical CSI, as described in
Section III-C;
• secrecy rate maximization with perfect CSI;
• maximum power allocation, i.e. p = Pmax, and beam-
former w = h/‖h‖ matched to the legitimate channel.
For any channel realization (h, g), the transmit power p and
beamforming vector w resulting from each algorithm have
been used to compute (5), and the presented results have
been obtained by averaging over 1000 independent channel
realizations, generated as Gaussian random vectors with zero
mean and identity covariance matrix. The system parameters
have been set to Pc = 5W, µ = 1, and NA = 3, while the
communication bandwidth is 1MHz.
As expected, from Fig. 3 we find that the best SEE is
obtained when perfect CSI is available, whereas a gap is
observed in case only statistical CSI is used for resource
allocation. Moreover, we can observe how the SEE achieved
by SEE optimization eventually saturates for high Pmax.
This is explained recalling that the SEE is not monotonically
increasing with the transmit power, but instead admits a max-
imum value. Therefore, for low values of Pmax, transmitting
with full power is the optimal energy-efficient policy, but once
Pmax is large enough to allow achieving the peak value of the
SEE, the excess transmit power is not used and the achieved
SEE value keeps constantly equal to the peak value. Instead,
for large Pmax, the SEE achieved by the resource allocation
that maximizes the secrecy rate decreases, because in this case
all of the available power Pmax is used.
A similar scenario is considered in Fig. 4, with the differ-
ence that the reported metric is the secrecy rate rather than
the SEE. In this case, as expected, allocating the resource so
as to maximize the secrecy rate yields an increasing achieved
value of the secrecy rate. Instead, the value of the secrecy rate
achieved by maximizing the SEE eventually saturates, both
with perfect and statistical CSI, which can be explained by
similar remarks as for Fig. 3.
Next, we analyze the MIMO-ME scenario. The considered
system parameters are NA = NB = NE = 2, Pc = 5W, and
µ = 1. Each entry of the channel matrices has been generated
as a realization of a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
with variance σ2h and σ
2
g for the legitimate and eavesdropper
channels, respectively. The following illustrations have been
obtained by averaging over 1000 independent channel realiza-
tions.
Fig. 5 compares the achieved instantaneous SEE versus
Pmax, with σh = 2 and σg = 1, for the following resource
allocation schemes:
• SEE maximization with perfect CSI by Algorithm 1;
• SEE maximization with perfect CSI and eigen-mode
selection from [6];
• Secrecy rate maximization with perfect CSI by adapted
Algorithm 1 as explained in Remark 1;
• SEE maximization with statistical CSI by Algorithm 2.
As in the MISO-SE case, the best performance is obtained
when perfect CSI is available. Moreover, the results indicate
that the proposed Algorithm 1, outperforms the eigenmode
selection scheme which allocates the transmit directions after
[6]. This shows the trade-off between Algorithm 1, which
is able to determine a KKT point of the SEE maximization
problem by solving a sequence of PC fractional problems, and
the more heuristic eigenmode selection scheme, which requires
to solve only one PC fractional problem, but can not claim to
obtain a KKT point of the problem.
The comparison between Algorithm 1 and the eigenmode
selection scheme is further analyzed in Fig. 6. Here, we
compare the SEE achieved by the two schemes for increasing
values of σh = 2; 6; 10 and σg = 1. We can see that
the gap between the two schemes shrinks for increasing σh.
This is explained observing that increasing σh scales the
eigenvalues of HHH by a factor σ2h, and that HH
H is full-
rank with probability4 1. As a consequence, for increasing
σh the probability that HHH  GGH increases, and, as
observed in Remark 2, in this case both algorithms globally
maximize the SEE.
Finally, we analyze the performance of the proposed se-
quential convex optimization algorithm in terms of obtained
secrecy rate. In particular, Fig. 7 illustrates the secrecy rate
obtained by Algorithm 1 when it is used to optimize both
the SEE and the secrecy rate, for σh = 2. The performance
of Algorithm 1 in terms of secrecy rate are contrasted to the
global optimum, which is provided in [8] for the special case
of NA = 2. Remarkably, the results indicate that the proposed
sequential convex optimization framework virtually performs
as the global optimum.
4Recall that both HHH and GGH are realizations of Wishart matrices,
and that the probability that the minimum eigenvalue of a Wishart matrix with
dimension n is lower than some positive z is equal to 1− e−nz [34].
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have investigated the problem of resource
allocation in MISO-SE and MIMO-ME systems. Unlike most
previous related papers, the goal of the resource allocation
process has been on maximizing the system bit/Joule energy
efficiency. In particular, two energy-efficient metrics have been
considered, the SEE, defined as the ratio between the secrecy
rate and the consumed power, and the SKEE, defined as the
ratio between the secret-key rate and the consumed power.
The resource allocation has been performed considering both
perfect CSI and statistical CSI of the channel between the
legitimate user and the eavesdropper.
In the MISO-SE scenario, we show how the problems can be
reformulated as PC maximizations, determining the globally
optimal resource allocation.
In the MIMO-ME scenario, we use fractional programming
to obtain the global optimum of the SKEE maximization
problem. The SEE maximization problem is more challeng-
ing and we integrate fractional programming with sequential
convex optimization to find resource allocations fulfilling first-
order optimality conditions. Numerical results indicate that the
proposed approach achieves near-optimal performance.
APPENDIX A
GENERALIZED CONCAVITY AND FRACTIONAL
PROGRAMMING THEORY
We limit our review to those results which are used in this
work. For a more detailed review, we refer the reader to [35,
Chapter 6], [36, Chapters 3, 4], [37], and [14].
Definition 1 (Pseudo-concavity). Let C ⊆ Rn be a convex set.
Then r : C → R is PC if and only if, for all x1,x2 ∈ C, it is
differentiable and
r(x2) < r(x1)⇒ ∇(r(x2))T (x1 − x2) > 0 . (55)
In a similar way we can define strict pseudo-concavity.
Definition 2 (Strict pseudo-concavity). Let C ⊆ Rn be a
convex set. Then r : C → R is strictly PC if and only if,
for all x1 6= x2 ∈ C, it is differentiable and
r(x2) ≤ r(x1)⇒ ∇(r(x2))T (x1 − x2) > 0 . (56)
The interest for PC functions stems from the following
result.
Proposition 5. Let r : C → R be a PC function. Then,
(a) If x∗ is a stationary point for r, then it is a global
maximizer for r;
(b) The KKT conditions for the problem of maximizing r
subject to convex constraints are necessary and sufficient
conditions for optimality;
(c) If r is strictly PC, then a unique maximizer exists.
Pseudo-concavity plays a key-role in the optimization of
fractional functions, due to the following result.
Proposition 6. Let r(x) =
f(x)
g(x)
, with f : C ⊆ Rn → R and
g : C ⊆ Rn → R+. If f is non-negative, differentiable, and
concave, while g is differentiable and convex, then r is PC.
If g is affine, the non-negativity of f can be relaxed. Strict
pseudo-concavity holds if either f is strictly concave, or g is
strictly convex.
Finally, let us introduce the definition of fractional program.
Definition 3 (Fractional program). Let X ⊆ Rn, and consider
the functions f : X → R+0 and g : X → R+. A fractional
program is the optimization problem
max
x∈X
f(x)
g(x)
. (57)
The following result relates the solution of (57) to the
auxiliary function F (β) = maxx∈X {f(x)− βg(x)}.
Proposition 7 ( [37]). An x∗ ∈ X solves (57) if and only
if x∗ = arg maxx∈X {f(x) − β∗g(x)}, with β∗ being the
unique zero of F (β). Moreover, β∗ coincides with the global
maximum of (57).
This result allows us to solve (57) by finding the zero of
F (β). An efficient algorithm to do so is the Dinkelbach’s
algorithm, which exhibits a super-linear convergence rate [37],
and is reported here in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Dinkelbach’s algorithm
Set ε > 0; β = 0; F > ε;
while F ≥ ε do
x∗ = arg maxx∈X {f(x)− βg(x)}
F = f(x∗)− βg(x∗);
β = f(x∗)/ g(x∗);
end while
If f(x) and g(x) are concave and convex, respectively, and
if X is a convex set, then the Dinkelbach’s algorithm requires
to solve one convex problem in each iteration. If instead one
of these assumptions is not fulfilled, Dinkelbach’s algorithm
is still guaranteed to converge to the global solution, but the
auxiliary problem to be globally solved in each iteration to
compute F becomes NP-hard. More in general, in this scenario
no computationally-efficient algorithm is known to find the
global solution of (57).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The result follows if we can show that the objective function
is the ratio of a strictly concave over an affine function. The
denominator of the objective is clearly affine, and we are left
to show the concavity of the numerator. To this end, we need to
prove that λQ(p) is concave in p. From (16) we can compute
λQ(p) as shown in (58) at the top of next page. Next, upon
defining the function
z(p) =
√
(α+ 2g + ω(1 + pg))2 − 4g(g + α) (59)
we have λQ(p) = (f(p)(z(p) + α) + ωp)/2, and the thesis
follows if we can show that f(p)(z(p) + α) is concave in p.
To this end, we can equivalently show that gf(x)(z(x) + α)
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λQ(p) =
1
2
[
αf(p) + ωp+
√
(αf(p) + ωp)2 + 4gωpf(p)
]
=
1
2
[
αf(p) + ωp+ f(p)
√
α2 + ω2(1 + pg)2 + 2ω(α+ 2g)(1 + pg)
]
=
1
2
[
αf(p) + ωp+ f(p)
√
(α+ 2g + ω(1 + pg))2 − 4g(g + α)
] (58)
z
′
(x) = ω
ω(1 + x) + α+ 2g√
(ω(1 + x) + α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α)
z
′′
(x) =
−4g(g + α)ω2√
(ω(1 + x) + α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α) ((ω(1 + x) + α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α))
(61)
is concave in x = pg. Computing the second derivative of
gf(x)(z(x) + α), after ordinary elaborations we obtain
2z
′
(x)
(1 + x)2
− 2(z(x) + α)
(1 + x)3
+
xz
′′
(x)
1 + x
, (60)
with z
′
(x) and z
′′
(x) given by (61). Plugging (61) in (60),
after some elaborations we get that (60) is negative if and only
if
4g(g + α)− α
√
(ω(1 + x) + (α+ 2g))2 − 4g(g + α)
< ω(α+ 2g)(1 + x) + (α+ 2g)2
+
(1 + x)2xω24g(g + α)
2((ω(1 + x) + α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α))
(62)
Let us distinguish two cases. If α ≥ 0 the left-hand side (LHS)
is the sum of a constant and a negative function. On the other
hand, the RHS of (62) is the sum of a line with positive slope
and of a non-negative function for x ≥ 0. As a consequence,
if α ≥ 0 (62) holds for any x ≥ 0 provided that the intercept
of the line in the RHS is larger than the constant terms in the
LHS. To show this let us evaluate
ω(α+2g)+(α+2g)2 = ω(α+2g)+α2 +4g2 +4αg , (63)
which is larger than 4g(g + α).
Instead, if α ≤ 0, the LHS is the sum of a constant and a
positive function. In this case, a sufficient condition for (62)
to hold is
4g(g + α)− α
√
(ω(1 + x) + (α+ 2g))2 − 4g(g + α)
< ω(α+ 2g)(1 + x) + (α+ 2g)2 ,
(64)
wherein we have neglected the positive fraction at the RHS of
(62). To show (64), we first show that for x = 0 the LHS is
smaller than the RHS, and then we show that the LHS grows
more slowly than the RHS. For x = 0, (64) becomes
− α
√
(ω + α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α)
< ω(α+ 2g) + (α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α) = ω(α+ 2g) + α2 .
(65)
Since α ≤ 0, we can square both sides of (65) without
changing the direction of the inequality. Then, elaborating we
have
α2
[
ω2 + α2 + 2αω + 4gω
]
< α4 + ω2α2 + 4ω2g2 + 4ω2αg + 2α3ω + 4α2ωg ⇔
0 < g + α =
c
g
.
Let us now turn our attention to the derivatives of the LHS and
RHS of (64). The first-oder derivative of the LHS is equal to
−αz′(x), and is a decreasing function of x because −α ≥ 0
and z
′′
(x) is a negative function. Then, z
′
(x) achieves its
maximum value for x = 0. Instead, the RHS has a positive
and constant derivative equal to ω(α + 2g) = ω(c/g + g).
Then, we can argue that the LHS grows more slowly than the
RHS provided we can show that
−αz′(0) < ω(α+ 2g) . (66)
Elaborating, (66) is equivalent to
α2
[
1 +
4g(g + α)
(ω + α+ 2g)2 − 4g(g + α)
]
< (α+ 2g)2 , (67)
where we have squared both sides of the inequality without
changing the direction of the inequality because −α ≥ 0.
Further elaborating reveals that (67) is equivalent to
0 < (g + α)(ω + 4g + 2α) =
c
g
(
ω + 2g +
2c
g
)
. (68)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
The approach in [6, Theorem 1] can not be directly used due
to the fractional nature of (41a). However, this difficulty can
be circumvented recalling from Appendix A that a fractional
Problem as (41) is equivalent to the problem
max
Q0
{
log
∣∣∣INB +HQHH ∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣INE +GQGH ∣∣∣
− β∗(µtr(Q) + Pc)
}
(69a)
s.t. tr(Q) ≤ Pmax , (69b)
for the specific β∗ ≥ 0 which results in the value of (69a) to
be zero. We also recall from Appendix A that the optimal β∗
is equal to the SEE. Therefore, we will assume β∗ > 0, as the
case β∗ = 0 would imply a zero SEE.
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Then, we can equivalently work on the KKT conditions of
(69). Setting to zero the gradient of the Lagrangian we obtain
− (INA +HHHQ)−1HHH + (INA +GHGQ)−1GHG
+ (β∗µ+ λ)INA −M = 0 ,
with λ the Lagrange multiplier associated to the maximum
power constraint and M the matrix Lagrange multiplier
associated to the positive semi-definiteness constraint. Next,
multiplying from left by INA + H
HHQ and from right by
INA + QG
HG, and exploring the complementary slackness
condition MQ = 0, we obtain
(β∗µ+ λ)(INA +H
HHQ)(INA +QG
HG)
= M +HHH −GHG . (70)
Next, we follow the argument in [6, Theorem 1] to show that
(INA +H
HHQ)(INA +QG
HG) is positive definite. This
implies that (M + HHH − GHG)  0, because λ ≥ 0,
µ > 0, and β∗ > 0. Then, at the optimum we have
0 < u+,Q(M +H
HH −GHG)u+,Q
= u+,Q(H
HH −GHG)u+,Q ,
(71)
where have again exploited the condition MQ = 0.
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